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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tara Moskios appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict
finding her guilty of trafficking in marijuana.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
After officers executed a search warrant and found approximately six
pounds of marijuana in his home, Robert Tomlinson agreed to work for law
enforcement as a confidential informant.

(Tr., p.110, L.1 - p.111, L.3, p.210,

L.21 - p.212, L.4.) Tomlinson advised Detective Robert Berrier that he obtained
his marijuana from Brian Pinto, who lived in Kuna, Idaho, and Carlos Pinto, who
lived in Bend, Oregon. (Tr., p.111, L.24 - p.113, L.14, p.212, Ls.5-15, p.227,
Ls.14-15.) On December 10, 2009, at Detective Berrier's direction, Tomlinson
contacted Brian Pinto, who informed him that Carlos Pinto would be traveling
from Bend to Kuna that day and would be bringing with him 21 pounds of
marijuana.

(Tr., p.113, L.20 - p.115, L.19, p.235, L.22 - p.240, L.1; State's

Exhibit 1.) Tomlinson arranged to stop by Brian Pinto's house that evening for
the purpose of obtaining more marijuana. (State's Exhibit 1.)
At approximately 7:00 p.m. on December 10, 2009, officers observed a
Nissan Xterra arrive at Brian Pinto's residence. (Tr., p.121, L.25 - p.122, L.5,
p.269, L.16 - p.270, L.11.) The Xterra was registered to Tara Moskios who, at
the time, was Carlos Pinto's fiancee. (Tr., p.123, Ls.5-10, p.370, L.22 - p.371,
L.22.) Carlos and Moskios both exited the vehicle, and Moskios carried her twoyear-old son into the house.

(Tr., p.270, L.12 - p.271, L.7, p.371, Ls.15-22,
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p.379, Ls.19-23.) Carlos went to the back of the Xterra and, with Brian Pinto's
assistance, retrieved some luggage, including a large black duffel bag that
Carlos had "load[ed] up" with marijuana earlier in the day. (Tr., p.270, L.23 p.271, L.14, p.372, L.19 - p.373, L.6, p.380, L.9 - p.381, L.6.)
Shortly after Carlos and Moskios arrived at Brian Pinto's residence,
Tomlinson, fitted with a wire and carrying $13,000.00 in pre-recorded "buy
funds," went to the residence to consummate the previously arranged drug
transaction. (Tr., p.119, Ls.2-17, p.123, L.11 - p.125, L.8, p.241, L.5 - p.242,
L.1, p.247, Ls.10-12; State's Exhibit 2.)

When Tomlinson entered the house

Brian Pinto and his fiancee, Samantha Martindale, were sitting at the dinner
table with Carlos Pinto and Moskios. (Tr., p.247, L.13 - p.248, L.6.) Tomlinson
engaged Carlos and Moskios in a brief conversation about their trip, during which
Moskios talked about having driven to Kuna with "21 Ps in the back of [her] car."
(Tr., p.124, L.16 - p.126, L.7, p.193, Ls.2-6, p.248, Ls.7-14, p.249, Ls.2-24;
State's Exhibit 2.) She and Carlos also speculated that "cruising with the family"
had helped them avoid being stopped by a police officer who had followed them
for several miles during their trip.

(Tr., p.126, Ls.1-6, p.250, Ls.6-13; State's

Exhibit 2.) Following this conversation, Brian Pinto took Tomlinson to the master
bedroom, where Brian gave Tomlinson six pounds of marijuana and Tomlinson
gave Brian the $13,000.00 in pre-recorded funds to pay for a prior transaction.
(Tr., p.126, Ls.8-15, p.188, Ls.17-21, p, 127, L.6 - p.128, L.19, p.250, L.14 p.251, L.2, p.253, L.8 - p.256, L.19; State's Exhibit 2.)

Brian retrieved the

marijuana from the same large black duffel bag that he had earlier removed from
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Moskios' Xterra.

(Tr., p.137, Ls.9-18, p.257, Ls.16-20, p.260, Ls.6-10, p.276,

Ls.14-24.)
After the controlled buy, police executed a search warrant on Brian Pinto's
residence.

(Tr., p.129, Ls.4-10, p.272, Ls.3-17, p.319, L.24 - p.320, L.9.)

During the search officers found approximately $14,000.00 in cash - $13,000.00
of which matched the pre-recorded buy funds (Tr., p.135, Ls.5-20, p.290, L.16 p.292, L.4, p.336, L.24 - p.337, L. 17) - and over 23 pounds of marijuana (Tr.,
p.134, L.13- p.135, L.4, p.135, L.21 - p.136, L.13, p.137, Ls.7-18, p.138, L.13p.139, L.19, p.323, L.5 - p.335, L.19, p.337, L.18 - p.340, L.11, p.361, Ls.21-24,
p.364, Ls.10-18).

The police arrested Moskios, Martindale, Brian Pinto and

Carlos Pinto and took them to the police department where they were
interviewed by Detective Berrier. (Tr., p.141, Ls.6-18, p.144, Ls.2-8, p.148, L.16
- p.154, L.4.) After waiving her Miranda rights, Moskios told the officer that she
had lived with Carlos Pinto in Bend, Oregon, for several years; that she owned
the Xterra; that she knew what the odor of marijuana smelled like; that she knew
there was 21 pounds of marijuana in her vehicle; and that Carlos had obtained
the marijuana from a medical marijuana plant in southern Oregon. (Tr., p.151,
L.7 - p.154, L.1.)
A grand jury indicted Moskios for trafficking in marijuana. (R., pp.22-24.)
Pursuant to the state's motion, the case was consolidated with the cases of her
co-defendants, Brian Pinto, Carlos Pinto and Samantha Martindale. (R., pp.910.) Brian and Carlos pied guilty before trial. Moskios and Martindale pied not
guilty and were tried jointly. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found each of
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them guilty of trafficking in marijuana. (R., pp.169-72; Tr., p.526, L.11 - p.527,
L.13.) The district court entered judgment and imposed upon Moskios a unified
sentence of five years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.245-48.) Moskios timely
appealed. (R., pp.278-81.)
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ISSUES
Moskios states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Was reversible error committed when testimony came in
which was ruled as prohibited by the Judge's ruling regarding the
inadmissible evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b)?
2.
Did the District Court err when allowing questioning on
cross-examination which was outside the scope of direct
examination for the witness Carlos Pinto?
3.
Were the cases which were consolidated improperly joined
and thus unduly prejudicial?
4.
Did a failure to file for relief from prejudicial joinder in this
case amount to ineffective assistance of counsel arising to a level
to be addressed upon direct appeal?
5.
Did the District Court Judge err in improperly denying
language the defense proposed for jury Instruction Number 11?
6.
Does the cumulative effect of these errors warrant a new
trial in Ms. Moskios' case?
(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Must this Court decline to consider Moskios' claim of improper joinder
because she failed to preserve the issue below and has failed to argue, much
less establish, fundamental error?
2.
Has Moskios failed to present her ineffective assistance of counsel claim
for appellate review?
3.
Did Moskios fail to preserve for appeal her claim that evidence was
admitted in violation of the trial court's order excluding I.R.E. 404(b) evidence
and, alternatively, has she failed to show any basis for reversal?
4.
Has Moskios failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
by not limiting the state's cross-examination of Carlos Pinto?
5.

Is Moskios' claim of instructional error barred by the invited error doctrine?

6.

Has Moskios failed to establish cumulative error?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Moskios Is Not Entitled To Appellate Review Of Her Claim Of Improper Joinder
Because She Failed To Preserve It By Way Of Objection Below And Has Failed
To Argue. Much Less Establish. Fundamental Error
For the first time on appeal, Moskios argues that she was prejudiced by
the consolidation of her case with that of her co-defendant, Samantha
Martindale. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.) Moskios concedes that "[n]o motion for
relief from prejudicial joinder was ever filed in the case." (Appellant's brief, p.10.)
Nevertheless, she asks this Court to grant her a new trial because, she
contends, "joinder in this case was not proper." (Appellant's brief, p.12.) This
Court must decline to consider the merits of Moskios' improper joinder claim
because Moskios did not assert it below and, therefore, failed to preserve the
issue for appeal.
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved
for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _ , 245
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d
125, 129 (1995)). Nor will Idaho's appellate courts "review a trial court's alleged
error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the
basis for the assignment of error." State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d
942, 946 (1993);

also State v. Olson, 138 Idaho 438, 442, 64 P.3d 967, 971

(Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231,235,985 P.2d 111, 115
(1999)). An exception to these principles exists if the alleged error constitutes
fundamental error.

Perry, 150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d at 976.

However, the

burden of demonstrating fundamental error rests squarely with the defendant
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asserting the error for the first time on appeal. ~at_, 245 P.3d at 980; State
v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 717, 215 P.3d 414, 437 (2009).

To carry that

burden, a defendant claiming error for the first time on appeal must demonstrate
that the error she alleges "(1) violates one or more of [her] unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."
Perry, 150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d at 980.
Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case shows that
Moskios waived appellate consideration of her improper joinder claim. Moskios
did not file a motion to sever or otherwise object to the consolidation of her case
with that of Martindale's. (See generally, R.; see also Appellant's brief, p.10.)
Nor has she argued on appeal that consolidation of the cases constituted
fundamental error under the standards articulated in Perry, supra.

(See

generally, Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.) Because the issue was neither presented
to or decided by the trial court, and because Moskios has not even asserted
fundamental error, much less attempted to carry her burden of demonstrating it,
this Court must decline to consider the merits of Moskios' improper joinder claim.

11.
Moskios Has Failed To Present Her Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim For
Appellate Review
As an alternative to her unpreserved claim of improper joinder, Moskios
asks this Court to grant her a new trial on the basis that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to file a motion to sever.
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(Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.)

Moskios' ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not appropriately before this
court on direct appeal because it was not raised or developed before the district
court and would

be more appropriately addressed

in a post-conviction

proceeding.
It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a claim not raised before the
district court will not be considered on appeal. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,
Whether the claim was preserved is a

398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).

"threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834
(Ct. App. 1989).

Consistent with the preservation principle, Idaho's appellate

courts generally will not consider an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Blackburn, 99 Idaho 222, 222223, 579 P.2d 1205, 1205-06 (1978) ("The record before us on this appeal is
devoid of any factual information to support Blackburn's [ineffective assistance of
counsel] claims. The proper forum for raising those allegations is post conviction
proceedings as provided by I.C. § 19-4901 et seq."); State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho
374, 375-376, 859 P.2d 972, 973-74 (Ct. App. 1993) ("Both our Supreme Court
and this Court have often stated that it is generally inappropriate to raise a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal from the judgment of
conviction. Rather, such claims are more appropriately presented through postconviction relief proceedings where an evidentiary record can be developed.").
The reasons underlying the appellate courts' general unwillingness to consider
ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the first time on appeal is the lack of
an adequate record and the resulting consequence that an adverse decision
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would prevent a defendant from developing the claim in a more appropriate
forum because the claim would be barred by res judicata. Mitchell, 124 Idaho at
376, 859 P.2d at 97 4; see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,

245 P.3d

961, 976 {2010) (adopting three-part test for reviewing claims of fundamental
error, including requirement that defendant demonstrate "the error must be clear
or obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision"). As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Smith v. State, 146
Idaho 822, 834, 203 P .3d 1221, 1233 (2009):
This Court has recognized that a defendant may raise the issue of
the effectiveness of counsel from a trial resulting in a criminal
conviction, while cautioning that this course of action may result in
application of the doctrine of res judicata. Parrott v. State, 117
Idaho 272, 274, 787 P.2d 258, 260 (1990) (stating that a defendant
may appeal counsel's effectiveness at trial directly or in a postconviction proceeding, but he may not do both). We recognize that
a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel usually requires an
evidentiary hearing, and resolution of such claims can be difficult
for an appellate court examining a trial record in which counsel's
performance was not at issue. Carler v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791,
702 P.2d 826, 829 (1985) (citation omitted).
Although the Court in Smith deviated from the general policy against
entertaining an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for the first time on
appeal, it did so, in part, on "procedural policy grounds." 146 Idaho at 834, 203
P.3d at 1233. Specifically, Smith was challenging his designation as a violent
sexual predator ("VSP") on grounds that were not preserved, and he argued the
claims were not preserved due to ineffective assistance of counsel. M.,_ Smith
contended that if he could not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims
for the first time on appeal from the district court's order affirming his VSP
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designation, he would never be able to do so because there was "no procedural
vehicle for this claim."

kl

The Court agreed, concluding, "Because there do not

appear to be any other procedural grounds for the relief Smith seeks and
because we believe that the record on appeal is sufficient to determine whether
his claims have merit, we will consider Smith's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in this appeal."

kl

Moskios does not cite Smith, nor rely on its rationale, in explaining why
she believes her ineffective assistance of counsel claim is appropriate for
consideration for the first time on direct appeal.
consideration of Moskios' claim.

Nor does Smith compel

Unlike Smith, who had no other procedural

mechanism for bringing his claim, Moskios can raise her ineffective assistance of
counsel claim in an application for post-conviction relief brought pursuant to the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, I.C. § 19-4901, et. seq.

This Court

should require her to do so because, unlike Smith, the record in this case has
not been sufficiently developed to address the merits of Moskios' claim.
To prove her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Moskios must
demonstrate both that her counsel's performance was deficient - i.e., that it was
based on some objective shortcoming and not the result of sound trial strategy and that she was prejudiced thereby. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984).

The record in this case is insufficient to address even the

deficient performance prong of Moskios' ineffective assistance of counsel claim
because there is no evidence regarding the reasons counsel did not move to
sever Moskios' case from that of her co-defendant, Samantha Martindale.
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In

light of the fact that Moskios' trial counsel also represented Martindale, it is
entirely conceivable that counsel had a tactical reason or strategy behind not
filing a motion to sever. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this Court
must presume that the decision was strategic. State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917,
923, 655 P.2d 434, 440 (1981) (where ineffective assistance of counsel is raised
as an issue on direct appeal, absent established facts to the contrary, "it must be
presumed that defense counsel's actions were not due to inadequate
preparation or ignorance, and that defendant's representation by counsel was
competently carried out").
Because Moskios' ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not raised
or developed before the district court, and because there is no policy reason for
considering the claim for the first time on appeal since Moskios can still pursue
the claim in post-conviction, this Court should decline to address Moskios'
argument that trial counsel was ineffective. If the Court does consider Moskios'
claim, it should find that Moskios has failed to carry her burden of showing that
counsel was ineffective.

111.
Moskios Did Not Preserve For Appeal Her Claim That Evidence Was Admitted In
Violation Of The Court's Order Excluding I.RE. 404(b) Evidence And,
Alternatively, Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversal
A.

Introduction
Prior to trial, the state moved in limine to present in its case in chief I.R.E.

404(b) evidence of Moskios' and Martindale's knowledge of and participation in
prior drug transactions. (R., pp.92-100.) Specifically, the state sought to elicit

11

testimony from the confidential informant that: (1) Martindale was usually present
when he purchased marijuana from Brian Pinto and, on more than one occasion,
Martindale directly participated in the delivery of marijuana to him (R., p.96; Tr.,
p.47, Ls.9-18); and (2) Moskios was present on at least five prior occasions
when he purchased marijuana from Brian Pinto and/or Martindale and that
"during all of those transactions, except the currently charged transaction,
[MoskiosJ was smoking marijuana and involved in the conversation of marijuana
sales, weight, quality, and arrangement of the next deal" (R., p.96). The state
also sought to elicit testimony from Detective Berrier regarding Moskios' and
Martindale's post-Miranda statements in which "they both admit[tedJ to knowing
that dealing was going on, knowing that they used cash for - to pay their bills
from that dealing, knowing where the cash was kept, [and] knowing that large
quantities of marijuana were either stored in vehicles or their home." (Tr., p.47,
L.23 - p.48, L.8;

also R., pp.96-97.)

The state argued the proffered

evidence was relevant to prove Moskios' and Martindale's knowledge, intent and
motive to possess the marijuana they were charged with possessing in this case.
(R., pp.92-99; Tr., p.47, L.9 - p.49, L.16.)
Following a hearing, at which Moskios' counsel objected only on the
asserted basis that the state had failed to give timely notice of its proffered I.R.
404(b) evidence (Tr., p.49, L.23 - p.53, L.25, p.58, L.8 - p.61, L.22), the district
court ruled the proffered evidence unduly prejudicial and therefore inadmissible
in the state's case in chief. (Tr., p.62, L.17 - p.64, L.10, p.65, L.10 - p.66, L.13,
p.67, Ls.6-10.) The court reasoned:
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... [T]he indictment alleges, in this particular case, that the
defendant did knowingly bring into the state, and/or was in actual or
constructive possession of 5 pounds or more of marijuana. So, in
that in this particular case, while that's called drug trafficking, the
fact that she had been involved in drug trafficking at other times
wouldn't necessarily be relevant to the fact that the defendant in
this case was in constructive possession or in actual possession of
this marijuana.
. .. I would normally allow the 4 - the 404(b) evidence, but in
this particular case, ... the probative value of it would be
outweighed by the prejudicial value, because of the fact that the
defendant is not charged with being part of the business in this
particular case or - and, in fact, the allegations there did not
indicate that ... either defendant had ... a financial interest in the
selling of the marijuana.
(Tr., p.63, Ls.1-22; see also Tr., p.65, L.10 - p.66, L.13.) When asked by the
state for clarification whether the defendants' statements to Detective Berrier
"regarding prior incidents that they were aware of" were not admissible in the
state's case in chief, the district court responded, "Yes." (Tr., p.64, Ls.12-17.)
The court clarified, however, that such statements may be admissible for rebuttal
or impeachment. (Tr., p.64, L.19 - p.65, L.3, p.67, Ls.6-10.)
For the first time on appeal, Moskios argues that evidence was admitted
in violation of the court's ruling prohibiting use of the state's proposed I.RE.
404(b) evidence in its case in chief.

(Appellant's brief, pp.3-8.)

This Court

should decline to consider the merits of Moskios' argument because she did not
object below to the alleged violations of the court's order and she has not
argued, much less established, that the allegedly erroneous admission of the
challenged evidence constituted fundamental error.

Even if preserved by the

trial court's general order excluding the state's I.RE. 404(b) evidence, Moskios
has failed to show any basis for reversal because a review of the record shows
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no clear violation of the district court's ruling; even there was, the admission of
the evidence in violation of the court's order was harmless because it did not
result in the introduction of any evidence actually prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b).

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
Whether an issue was preserved presents a "threshold" inquiry.

State v.

Stevens, 115 Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989).
The interpretation of an unambiguous court order presents a question of
law over which the appellate court exercises free review. Suchan v. Suchan, 113
Idaho 102, 106, 741 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1987); Sun Valley Ranches. Inc. v. Prairie
Power Cooperative, Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 131, 856 P.2d 1292, 1298 (Ct. App.
1993).

The interpretation of an ambiguous court order, on the other hand,

presents a question of fact. Suchan, 113 Idaho at 106, 741 P.2d at 1293.

C.

This Court Must Decline To Consider Moskios' Claim That Evidence Was
Admitted In Violation Of The District Court's I.R.E. 404(b) Ruling Because
Moskios Did Not Preserve The Issue By Way Of Objection Below And
Has Not Argued. Much Less Established. That The Allegedly Erroneous
Admission Of The Evidence Constituted Fundamental Error
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it constitutes

fundamental error.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _ , 245 P.3d 961, 976

(2010); State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,254 P.3d 77 (Ct. App. 2011) (review
denied July 7, 2011 ); State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196
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(Ct. App. 2010). In the absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to
remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the
defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right
to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." Perry, 150 Idaho at

245 P.3d at 976. Review

without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that "one or
more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2) the
constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for any
additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to object
was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a reasonable
probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial proceedings."

kl

at

_ , 245 P.3d at 978.
Citing United States Supreme Court precedent, the Idaho Supreme Court
recently explained the rationale underlying the contemporaneous objection
requirement and fundamental error review as follows:
"This limitation on appellate-court authority serves to induce the
timely raising of claims and objections, which gives the [trial] court
the opportunity to consider and resolve them. Puckett v. U.S., [556
U.S. 129, _ , 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1428] (2009). Ordinarily, the trial
court is in the best position to determine the relevant facts and to
adjudicate the dispute. Id. "In the case of an actual or invited
procedural error, the [trial] court can often correct or avoid the
mistake so that it cannot possibly affect the ultimate outcome." Id.
Furthermore, requiring a contemporaneous objection prevents the
litigant from sandbagging the court, i.e., "remaining silent about his
objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not
conclude in his favor." Id.
Perry, 150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d at 976 (brackets original). Because one of the
purposes of the contemporaneous objection requirement is to promote the timely
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raising of objections to the trial court, who is generally best situated to consider
and resolve them, the appellate court "will not pore through a trial transcript and
evaluate [each claim of error] in order to determine whether there is
objectionable material, let alone add them up and analyze them as a collective
due process violation." Norton, 151 Idaho at_, 254 P.3d at 84.
For the first time on appeal, Moskios identifies, in extremely general
terms, several instances in which she contends evidence was admitted in
violation of the district court's I.R.E. 404(b) ruling.

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-8.)

Moskios apparently believes that the district court's pretrial order excluding the
state's proffered 404(b) evidence was itself sufficient to preserve for appeal her
claims that evidence was admitted in violation of that order. Moskios is incorrect.
"Even where a pretrial motion preserves an evidentiary objection for appeal, the
defense may waive the objection during trial." State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784,
794, 932 P.2d 907, 917 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted).

Generallzed

argument made in response to a pretrial motion in limine does not preserve for
appellate review specific objections to evidence ultimately admitted.

State v.

Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 220-21, 207 P.3d 186, 196-97 (Ct. App. 2009). Rather,
"[f]or an objection to be preserved for appellate review, the specific ground for
the objection must be clearly stated." State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11
P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing I.R.E. 103(a)(1 ); State v. Gleason, 130
Idaho 586, 592, 944 P.2d 721, 727 (Ct. App. 1997)); accord Parmer, 147 Idaho
at 220-21, 207 P.3d at 196-97; Gray, 129 Idaho at 794, 932 P.2d at 917; cf.
Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 233, 240 n.4, 233 P.3d 164, 171 n.4 (Ct. App. 2010)

16

(district court not required to sua sponte strike portions of testimony that varied
from offer of proof made in support of motion in limine).
Moskios waived her challenges to the evidence she contends was
admitted in violation of the district court's I.RE. 404(b) ruling by not raising those
challenges at trial.

In response to the state's motion in limine Moskios argued

only that a portion of the state's proffered 404(b) evidence should be excluded
on the basis that it was not timely disclosed. (Tr., p.49, L.23 - p.53, L.25, p.58,
L.8 - p.61, L.22.) The district court rejected this as a basis for exclusion, but
held the evidence inadmissible in the state's case in chief based on its
determination that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. (Tr., p.62,
L.17 - p.64, L.10, p.65, L.10 - p.66, L.13, p.67, Ls.6-10.) Moskios never argued
to the district court that the evidence she challenges for the first time on appeal
violated either the substantive provisions of I.R.E. 404(b) or the district court's
ruling. (See generally Tr., pp.150, 200, 220-43, 383-413.) Having failed to do
so, there has been no determination by the trial court whether the challenged
evidence actually fell within the scope of the trial court's ruling and, if so, whether
events subsequent to the district court's in limine ruling rendered the evidence
admissible.

(See Tr., p.64, Ls.4-10, p.65, Ls.1-3, p.67, Ls.6-9 (clarifying that

evidence may be admissible as impeachment and/or rebuttal).)

The issue

Moskios raises was thus not preserved for appeal.
Because Moskios failed to object below to the evidence she now contends
was admitted in violation of the court's I.RE. 404(b) ruling, she is only entitled to
appellate review of her claim if she can demonstrate fundamental error. Perry,
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150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d at 976. Moskios has not even attempted to carry her
burden on appeal and, even if she had, such attempt would fail. Whether the
alleged error is regarded strictly as a violation of the district court's pretrial order
or as the admission of evidence prohibited by I.RE. 404(b), the fundamental
error doctrine "is not invoked" because neither claim implicates a constitutional
right. Perry, 150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d at 978 ("[W]here ... the asserted error
relates not to infringement upon a constitutional right, but to a violation of a rule
or statute ... the 'fundamental error' doctrine is not invoked."); Norton, 151 Idaho
at_, 254 P.3d at 83-84 (noting that the requirements of I.RE. 404(b) "are not
of constitutional import" and

rejecting

"attempts to characterize alleged

evidentiary errors, to which no objection was made at trial, as a due process
violation of the right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal"). Because Moskios' claim of
error fails under the first prong of the fundamental error analysis set forth in
Perry, she is not entitled to appellate review of that claim for the first time on
appeal.

D.

Even If Preserved, Moskios Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversal
Based On The Alleged Violations Of The District Court's I.R.E. 404(b}
Ruling
1.

The Evidence Moskios Challenges Was Not Clearly Excluded By
The District Court's Pretrial Ruling

Even if Moskios' claims that evidence was admitted in violation of the
district court's I.RE. 404(b) ruling are deemed preserved, Moskios has failed to
show any basis for reversal because a review of the record shows the
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challenged evidence was not clearly excluded by the district court's pretrial
ruling.
The district court ruled that the state could not present in its case in chief
evidence concerning Moskios' and Martindale's knowledge of or participation in
prior drug transactions.

(Tr., p.62, L.20 - p.64, L.17, p.65, L.10 - p.66, L.13,

p.67, Ls.6-10.) Although Moskios does not identify the precise testimony she
believes was admitted in violation of this order, she appears to argue that the
1

state violated this ruling by eliciting testimony from Detective Berrier on direct
examination that Martindale made post-Miranda statements to the effect that she
knew Brian Pinto had extra cash, she paid bills with the extra cash, she knew
where Brian kept the cash, she knew Brian obtained marijuana from Carlos
Pinto, and she was aware of "individuals coming to the residence and visiting
with Brian in the bedroom for a short period of time and then leaving." (Tr.,
p.149, L.25 - p.151, L.1; Appellant's brief, p.6.) Moskios argues in conclusory
fashion that this evidence related only to Martindale's "knowledge of previous
drug dealing activities, which the court had ruled impermissible and prejudicial."
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) Moskios is incorrect because, on its face, the evidence
discloses nothing about Martindale's knowledge of or participation in prior drug
dealings and at no point did the prosecutor attempt to tie Martindale's statements
to anything other than her knowledge as it related to the charged incident. (See

1

Moskios does not contend that the violations she alleges constituted
prosecutorial misconduct; rather, she contends only that the alleged violations
resulted in the introduction of inadmissible evidence. (See generally Appellant's
brief, pp.6-8.)
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Tr., p.148, L.16- p.151, L.1.) Moskios has failed to show that the admission of
this evidence violated the court's order.
Moskios next argues that the state violated the district court's pretrial
ruling by asking Detective Berrier on redirect examination "whether people going
to a bedroom and staying for short periods of time is consistent with sales of
marijuana." (Appellant's brief, p.6 (citing Tr., p.200).) Again, Moskios has failed
to show a clear violation of the district court's order because, on its face, the
challenged

evidence does not even implicate Moskios' or Martindale's

knowledge of or participation in prior drug transactions.
Moskios next contends that the state violated the district court's pretrial
ruling during its direct examination of the confidential informant by asking him
questions about the "frequency and nature of drug transactions" between Carlos
Pinto and himself.

(Appellant's brief, p.6.)

According to Moskios, "the only

possible relevance" of this evidence was to show that "these four individuals had
a consistent and ongoing drug-dealing relationship, and that therefore the two
co-defendants on trial at the time, Ms. Moskios and Ms. Martindale must have
had knowledge of it." (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7 (citing Tr., pp.220-430).) Moskios
has failed to identify any specific testimony that she contends actually violated
the court's order, however. Having failed to do so, she has failed to demonstrate
any error in the admission of the evidence. See,~. I.AR. 35; State v. Walker,
121 Idaho 18, 20, 822 P.2d 537, 539 (Ct. App. 1991) (appellate court will neither
"search the record for unspecified error" nor presume error); State v. Hoisington,
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104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983) (appellate court will not search the
record for errors).
Moskios finally argues that the state violated the district court's pretrial
ruling by cross-examining Carlos Pinto - who at the time of trial was Moskios'
husband (Tr., p.370, L.20 - p.371, L.7) - regarding "the nature of his ongoing
drug-sales," "the lifestyle he led upon those proceeds," "whether or not Ms.
Moskios had knowledge of the extent of Mr. Pinto's marijuana grow operations,"
"the lifestyle and assets and the price of those assets," and "Moskios' past
knowledge of the drug operations" (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8 (citing Tr., p.383413)). Contrary to Moskios' assertions, however, this evidence was not admitted
in violation of the district court's pretrial ruling but was instead properly admitted
to impeach Carlos Pinto's testimony, a purpose for which the district court
specifically ruled that evidence of Moskios' prior knowledge of and participation
in prior drug transactions may be admitted.

(Tr., p.64, L.4 - p.66, L.13, p.67,

Ls.6-9.)
Carlos testified on direct examination that when he and Moskios left their
house in Bend on the date of the charged incident, Moskios had no idea that
there was 21 pounds of marijuana in the back of her car.

(Tr., p.371, L.23 -

p.374, L.21, p.377, Ls.15-23.) He testified that he did not tell Moskios about the
marijuana until they were well into their trip, at which point Carlos claimed that
Moskios "lost it" and became "very angry." (Tr., p.377, L.15 - p.378, L.9.) He
also testified that Moskios did not have any contact with the marijuana after they
arrived at Brian Pinto's home.

(Tr., p.379, L.13 - p.382, L.2.)
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The clear

implication of Carlos' testimony was that Moskios did not know of the marijuana's
presence and had neither physical control of it, nor the power and intention to
control it - elements the state was required to prove in relation to the charged
crime. See ICJI 421 (defining possession). The state's questioning of Carlos on
cross-examination regarding Moskios' knowledge of, participation in, and profit
from previous marijuana transactions was directly impeaching of Carlos'
testimony that Moskios was originally unaware of, and then upset by, the
presence of 21 pounds of marijuana in her car. The district court ruled as much,
as it overruled Moskios' objection to the state's initial questioning of Carlos as
being beyond the scope of direct examination (Tr., p.383, L.16 - p.384, L.5) and
agreed with the state that evidence that Moskios knew about prior drug sales
and profited therefrom was relevant to impeach Carlos Pinto's testimony that
Moskios did not know anything about the marijuana she was charged with
possessing in this case (Tr., p.397, L.18 - p.399, L.1). Because the evidence
was admitted for impeachment, Moskios has failed to show any violation of the
court's pretrial ruling.

2.

Any Error In The Admission Of Evidence In Violation Of The District
Court's Ruling Is Harmless Because It Did Not Result In The
Introduction Of Evidence Actually Prohibited By I.R.E. 404(b)

The district court ruled the proffered I.R.

404(b) evidence inadmissible

in the state's case in chief based on its determination that the evidence was
unfairly prejudicial. (Tr., p.62, L.20 - p.64, L.17, p.65, L.10 - p.66, L.13, p.67,
Ls.6-10.) Correct application of the law to the facts shows, however, that the
district court's ruling was incorrect.

The proffered evidence was relevant to
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establish Moskios' knowledge and intent to possess the marijuana at issue in this
case, and its probative value for this purpose was not substantially outweighed
by any attendant danger of unfair prejudice. Thus, even if some evidence was
admitted in violation of the trial court's pretrial ruling, such did not result in
reversible error because it did not result in the introduction of evidence actually
prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b).

See I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or

variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.").
Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is relevant for any purpose
other than to prove the defendant's character in order to show she acted in
conformity therewith, and (b) the potential prejudice associated with proof of
character does not substantially outweigh the proper probative value of the
evidence. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230
(1999). The first prong of this test is met if the evidence is admissible for any
purpose other than proving character and actions in conformity therewith,
including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123
Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 87, 785 P.2d
647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence
if the danger of unfair prejudice from having the jury conclude the defendant is of
bad character substantially outweighs its proper probative value.

State v.

Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-276, 77 P.3d 956, 964-965 (2003).
Evidence concerning Moskios' knowledge of and participation in prior
marijuana sales was relevant for purposes other than proving Moskios' character
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and was not unfairly prejudicial. The state in this case was required to prove that
Moskios had actual or constructive possession of the marijuana that was the
subject of the controlled buy. (R., pp.158, 160 Uury instructions requiring state to
prove possession); see also IC,JI 421(pattern instruction on possession).)
Evidence that Moskios knew of and participated in Carlos Pinto's prior deliveries
of marijuana to Brian Pinto, and that she profited therefrom, was directly relevant
to establish Moskios' knowledge of and intent to control the marijuana that she
and Carlos transported from Bend to Boise in her vehicle. I.RE. 401; State v.
Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 735 P.2d 1089 (1987).
Contrary to the district court's determination, the evidence was not unfairly
prejudicial. In State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 785 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1989), the
Idaho Court of Appeals stated, "[a]II probative evidence is, to some extent,
prejudicial. The question is whether that prejudice is unfair - that is, whether it
harms the defendant not because of inferences which reasonably can be drawn
from the facts,

but because it inflames the jury and

'overmastering hostility.'"

rouses them to

Gauna, 117 Idaho at 88, 785 P.2d at 652.

In that

case, the court affirmed the admission of testimony from a witness/informant that
she had previously purchased marijuana from Gauna, reasoning, "[w]hile the
witness' testimony certainly bolstered the likelihood that Gauna possessed drugs
for reasons other than personal use, we do not believe it was so inflammatory
that it would lead a jury to convict Gauna regardless of other facts presented.''

kl at 87-88, 785 P.2d at 651-52.
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The reasoning of Gauna applies equally to the circumstances of this case.
While evidence of Moskios' knowledge of and participation in prior marijuana
deliveries certainly bolstered the likelihood that Moskios knowingly possessed
the marijuana she was charged with trafficking in this case, it was not so
inflammatory that it would have led the jury to convict her regardless of other
facts presented.

Indeed, given the undisputed evidence that Moskios became

aware during her trip from Bend to Kuna that she was transporting 21 pounds of
marijuana in her vehicle, there is very little danger that the jury convicted
Moskios based solely on her participation in prior drug transactions.
Because the state's 404(b) evidence was both relevant and not unfairly
prejudicial, any error arising from the admission of that evidence in violation of
the court's pretrial ruling did not affect Moskios' substantial rights.

Because

there was no error affecting Moskios' right to a fair trial, there was no reversible
error that would require this court to reverse Moskios' conviction.

IV.
Moskios Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Not Limiting The State's Cross-Examination Of Carlos Pinto
A.

Introduction
Moskios argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the

state to cross-examine Carlos Pinto as to matters that she contends were
outside the scope of direct examination.

(Appellant's brief, pp.8-11.)

To the

extent Moskios challenges "the entire line of questioning which ensued on crossexamination" (Appellant's brief, p.9), such challenge was not preserved by way of
a timely objection below and, as such, is not appropriately before this court on
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appeal. As to the only preserved challenges, Moskios has failed to establish an
abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
Whether an issue was preserved presents a "threshold" inquiry.

State v.

Stevens, 115 Idaho 457,459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989).
The control of cross-examination is committed to the sound discretion of
the trial judge. State v. Brummett, 150 Idaho 339,

247 P.3d 204, 209 (Ct.

App. 2011) (review denied Feb. 23, 2011 ); State v. Rauch, 144 Idaho 682, 685,
168 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 2007}. A decision to admit or deny evidence will
not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion.

ilL When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine:

(1) whether the

lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the
lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3} whether
the lower court reached its decision by exercise of reason. Rauch, 144 Idaho at
685, 168 P.3d at 1032.
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C.

Moskios Failed To Preserve For Appeal Her Challenge To The "Entire
Line Of Questioning Which Ensued On Cross-Examination"
Moskios argues that the district court abused its discretion by not limiting

the state's cross-examination of Carlos Pinto, arguing that "the entire line of
questioning which ensued on cross-examination" went to matters that the court
had previously ruled inadmissible pursuant to its pretrial ruling on the state's
motion to use I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (Appellant's brief, p.9.) Moskios did not
object to "the entire line of questioning" below and, as such, failed to preserve
the issue for appeal.

LR.

103(a)(1) (error may not be predicated upon a

ruling admitting evidence unless "a timely objection or motion to strike appears of
record"); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000) ("It
is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."). Nor can she
demonstrate that the alleged error is fundamental because it does not implicate,
much less violate, one of her unwaived constitutional rights. State v. Perry, 150
Idaho at 209,

245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). Thus, the issue Moskios raises is

not properly before this Court on appeal.

D.

Moskios Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Not Limiting The State's Cross-examination Of Carlos Pinto
In Response To Specific Objections That Such Examination Was Beyond
The Scope Of Direct Examination
Idaho Rule of Evidence 611 (b) governs the scope of cross-examination

and provides: "Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the
direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on
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direct examination." I.R.E. 611 (b). "The appropriate scope of cross examination
includes not only the facts testified to on direct examination, but other facts
connected with those facts, directly or indirectly, tending to explain, modify, or
qualify the inferences resulting from the direct examination." State v. Brummett,
150 Idaho 339, _ , 247 P.3d 204, 209 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Starry, 96
Idaho 148, 150, 525 P.2d 343, 345 (1974)); accord State v. Rauch, 144 Idaho
682, 685, 168 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 2007).
The subject matter of Carlos Pinto's testimony on direct examination
related almost exclusively to his assertions that Moskios was initially unaware
that her vehicle contained 21 pounds of marijuana and that she never had either
physical control of the marijuana or the power and intention to control it. (Tr.,
p.370, L.15 - p.383, L.12.) Over defense counsel's objections, the district court
allowed the state on cross-examination to ask Carlos whether he was employed
on the date of the charged offense (Tr., p.383, L.18 - p.384, L.5), and whether
he and Moskios had traveled before with marijuana in their car (Tr., p.408, L.9 p.409, L.4). Although Moskios argues otherwise, these questions (which were
the only questions specifically objected to by Moskios as being beyond the scope
of direct examination) did not exceed the scope of direct examination. Moskios'
knowledge of and intent to possess the marijuana she was charged with
trafficking in this case was a material issue in the case and was put squarely at
issue by Carlos' testimony on direct examination. The prosecutor's questions,
which related to Carlos' and Moskios' finances and Moskios' knowledge on prior
occasions that she and Carlos had traveled before with marijuana in their
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vehicle, tended both to impeach Carlos' credibility and to explain, modify, or
qualify the inferences resulting from his direct testimony that Moskios did not
possess the requisite knowledge or intent. Moskios has thus failed to establish
that the district court abused its discretion in allowing these lines of inquiry.

V.
Moskios Is Precluded By The Invited Error Doctrine From Challenging On Appeal
A Jury Instruction She Requested
A.

Introduction
Moskios argues that the district court erred as a matter of law by giving

the pattern jury instruction on constructive possession. (Appellant's brief, pp.1316.)

Because a review of the record shows that Moskios actually asked the

district court to give the challenged instruction, Moskios' claim is barred by the
doctrine of invited error.

B.

Moskios Cannot Assert As Error On Appeal The Giving Of An Instruction
Which She Herself Requested
"The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an

error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error." State v.
Norton, 151 Idaho 176, _ , 254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v.
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)). "One may
not complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in."

Norton, 151

Idaho at _ , 254 P.3d at 88 (citing State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706
P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 1208
(Ct. App. 1998)). These principles apply equally in cases of alleged instructional
error. In other words, an "'[a]ppellant cannot assert as error on appeal the giving
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of an instruction which he himself requested."' State v. Draper, _

P.3d _ ,

2011 WL 4030069, *11 (2011) (quoting State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 363,
690 P.2d 293, 298 (1984)).

A review of the record in this case shows that

Moskios' claim of instructional error is barred under the doctrine of invited error.
Before the state rested its case, the district court gave the parties copies
of its proposed final jury instructions, including the following pattern jury
instruction on constructive possession:

INSTRUCTION NO. 11
A person has possession of something if the person knows
of its presence and has physical control of it, or has the power and
intention to control it. More than one person can be in possession
of something if each knows of its presence and has the power and
intention to control it.
(R., p.158; see also Tr., p.306, Ls.5-11; compare ICJI 421.)

Moskios initially

objected to the pattern instruction and requested that it be modified to require the
state to prove that that the defendants had the power and intent to exercise both

"dominion and control' over the marijuana at issue.
L.16, p.308, L.16-p.309, L.13.)

(Tr., p.306, L.5 - p.307,

The district court granted Moskios' request

and, over the state's objection to the inclusion of the word "dominion," indicated it
would modify Instruction No. 11 to require the state to prove that the defendants
had the "power and intent to exercise dominion and control over" the controlled
substances. (Tr., p.307, L.17-p.308, L.14, p.311, L.9-p.315, L.2.)
After the defense rested and the state indicated it did not have any
rebuttal witnesses, the district court conducted an in-chambers conference with
counsel. (R., p.298; Tr., p.417, L.20 - p.419, L.21.) Following the conference,
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the court placed on the record the substance of the in-chambers discussion as
follows:
... [W]e had a discussion. And based on that discussion,
the Court is going to reverse itself and decide to give the ICJI
instruction on constructive possession, rather than the one with the
word dominion. And so, ... Instruction No. 11 will be replaced by
original Instruction 11 that you have in - in your copies.
(Tr., p.420, L.25 - p.421, L.7.) Moskios' counsel then stated for the record:
... I did discuss that with my clients, and I think I - briefly,
but we had talked about the issue of the instruction before, so they
were generally aware of it. But they - I informed them of the issues
involved, and they thought that was - the resolution that the Court
had proposed, and that we had all decided in chambers, was
appropriate.
(Tr., p.421, Ls.8-15.) With Moskios' consent, the district court ultimately gave
the pattern instruction on constructive possession. (R., p.158.)
After the jury found her guilty of trafficking in marijuana, Moskios moved
for a new trial, alleging, inter a/ia, that the trial court had coerced her into
retracting her request for a modified constructive possession instruction.

(R.,

pp.173-76, 240-41, 253-59.) The district court denied Moskios' motion and, in so
doing, made the following uncontested findings of fact in relation to Moskios'
claim of coercion:
As a visiting judge, I received a set of instructions prepared
by Judge Williamson that had been given to counsel. On the first
morning of trial, there were no requested jury instructions by the
defense on the subject of constructive possession on file. The first
time the Court knew that the defense was contesting the validity of
proposed Instruction No. 11, was at the jury instruction conference
at the end of the second day of trial.
Without having time for a complete analysis, the Court
decided to give the instruction requested by the defense. That was
identical to Instruction No. 11 except that to find the defendants
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guilty the jury would have to find that defendants had the "power
and intention to exercise dominion and control" over the marijuana
(emphasis added}.
Sometime during the third day of trial, I realized that
requiring the additional fact of dominion would place an unfair
burden on the state unless I also admitted at least some 404(b}
evidence that I earlier ruled should not at all be admitted. At the
close of the state's rebuttal, I held a conference with counsel in
chambers. At that time, I told counsel that because of the
additional burden put on the state, I would allow at least some
404(b) evidence if the sate wished to do so. The state stated that it
did so wish. At that time, defense counsel asked the Court if it
would stick to its earlier ruling excluding all 404(b) evidence if the
defense withdrew its request to give the "dominion" instruction. I
replied in the affirmative. Accordingly, Instruction No. 11 was given
to the jury.
The Court finds that there was no judicial misconduct or
prejudicial error as to Instruction No. 11. Since the time of trial, the
Court has come to the conclusion that it was proper to give
Instruction No. 11, since the Supreme Court has never adopted the
"dominion" portion that has been adopted by the Idaho Court of
Appeals . . . . However, the Court also holds that defense counsel
was not coerced into withdrawing his request for the "dominion"
instruction. Instead, defense counsel conferred with his clients,
and as a matter of trial tactics determined to keep all 404(b}
evidence out by agreeing to the ICJI instruction.
(R., pp.298-99 (emphasis and parenthetical reference thereto original}.}
On appeal, Moskios argues that the district court erred, as a matter of law,
by giving the pattern jury instruction on constructive possession, as opposed to
an instruction that would have required the state to prove that she had the power
and

intent to exercise both dominion and control over the marijuana.

(Appellant's brief, pp.14-16.)

Moskios fails to point out what the record

affirmatively shows, however - i.e., that Moskios retracted her request for a
modified instruction and specifically asked the district court to give the pattern
instruction instead.

(R., pp.298-99; Tr., p.420, L.25 - p.421, L.15.)
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Moskios

does not challenge the district court's determination that that choice was not the
result of coercion, but was instead the product of trial strategy. (See R., p.299.)
Nor would such claim be supported by the record. Moskios' counsel took pains
to make a record that he had discussed the issues surrounding the choice of
which instruction to request with his clients and that his clients agreed to the
resolution proposed in chambers.

(Tr., p.421, Ls.8-15.)

Because Moskios

chose, as a matter of trial strategy to request the giving of the pattern instruction
on constructive possession, she is barred by the invited error doctrine from
challenging that instruction on appeal. I;&., Draper, _

P.3d _ , 2011 WL

4030069, *11.

VI.
Moskios Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

State v.

Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).

In addition,

cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither objected to nor found
fundamental.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _ , 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010).

Moskios has failed to show any error, much less two or more errors. Thus, the
doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case. See, ~ . LaBelle v.
State, 130 Idaho 115,121,937 P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App. 1997).
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding Moskios guilty of trafficking in marijuana.
th

DATED this 24 day of October 2011.
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